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THE ORIGINS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN RESERVE BANK
by Stephen Gelb
The South African Reserve Bank was opened on June 30, 1921, having
been established under the provisions of the Currency and Banking Act
(No. 31 of J920). There was at the time only one other central bank
in the British Empire, the Bank of England itself. The Act had been
drafted after a situation of chaos developed in the South African
monetary system. In March 1919, when the British Government abandoned
its wartime rate of exchange between the pound sterling and gold, the
pound depreciated to produce a 'gold premium1. British gold
sovereigns, obtainable for 20s. from banks in S.A. now commanded a
considerably higher price outside the country.
Large numbers of coins were now smuggled out, contravening the
S.A. government's ban on their export. Although the premium was
effectively keeping many of the goldmines afloat, the S.A. banks found
themselves in a disastrous situation, being forced to import, and
provide to the public at 20s. increasing numbers of coins purchased at
the premium price. The eventual government response was to withdraw
sovereigns from circulation, and to establish the Reserve Bank to
prevent a recurrence of such an untenable situation. There was thus a
fundamental restructuring of the form of regulation of the S.A.
monetary system.
South African monetary historians have generally agreed that the
Bank•s establishment can be traced to the intervention of one
individual. As one recent summary put it:
The Treasury consulted Mr. Henry Strakosch of London to
assist them in the drafting of the required legislation
[following Government instructions, stemming from its 1919
Currency Conference] ... Therefore a Select Committee of
Parliament was appointed ... [which] was in turn dominated
by Strakosch and they accepted his proposals ... The S-C.
accordingly introduced a draft Bill into the House of
Assembly on the 5th July, 1920.
R.S. Sayer's history of the Bank of England adds a further dimension:
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The creation of the ... S.A. Reserve Bank ... owed most to
one man - Strakosch ... [but] he alone could not ... have
persauded the Union Government, had the concept of central
banking not already been in the air, and had there not
been a flavour of nationalism about it.
... [A] chance to embody these thoughts in pratical steps
came only when, in 1919-20, the Union Government cast
around for a policy on gold and exchange rates.
There is no attempt here to relate the restructuring of the
monetary system to broader changes occurring within the society at the
time. It is of course these broader struggles and changes which have
been one major concern of those writers who have used class analysis
to understand the history of the interwar period. Though unconcerned
with monetary history, their passing references to the Reserve Bank
have gone some way towards grounding Sayers* point. Thus Martin
Legassick sees the event as illustrative of the struggle between
•imperial1 and 'national' capital:
The strength of * national' forces meant that ... a sur-
prising proportion of capital accumulated remained in
South Africa. Indicative perhaps was the formation in
1920 of the SA Reserve Bank, the first of its kind in the
British Empire, taking from mine owners the right to sell
gold [this actually occurred only in 1925] and gradually
establishing local control over monetary policy.
In this paper, I advance an analysis of the reasons for
Strakosch*s considerable influence over this change in policy, by
developing, and greatly qualifying, the general thrust of Legassick's
point. This is done by locating the particular monetary problems of
the period in the context of the broader social changes which began to
manifest themselves at this time, and ultimately accumulated into the
change in hegemony from that of 'imperial' capital to that of national
capital.
II
To begin with, it is worth reviewing the pre-war monetary and
banking structure, so as to be able to indicate how and v/hy state
monetary regulation was transformed. Union and the granting of
Dominion status in 1910 did not imply any immediate change in S.A's
economic status within the British Empire, or in the relationship with
British finance capital. Subjection to British finance capital meant
that prior to 1910, it was the British Imperial State which was
ultimately responsible for exercising the usual functions of the
capitalist state. In 1910, not all of these functions were shifted
immediately on to the newly-established South African state.
One of the functions retained by the British state was the role of
the state in 'the reproduction of money as the general equivalent.1
It was the Bank of England which played the role of central bank in
the South African economy. This was based upon the centrality, as
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national currency, in the S.A. monetary system of the British gold
sovereign (specie), coined by the Royal Mint in London and legal
tender throughout S.A.
The remainder of South African currency consisted of private bank
money-notes (redeemable in gold coin) and chequing deposits - with the
latter predominant. In December, 1914, notes in circulation amounted
to only SA, £2,404,000, while chequing deposits totalled SA
£23,542,000. The issue of notes was regulated by four different
laws, applying to each province. In the Cape, notes had to be fully
backed by securities deposited with the Treasury, and in the other
three provinces, a gold reserve of at least 33% was required. There
were strict regulations concerning bank reporting and government
inspection, but none concerning bank deposits. This indicates that
the S.A state had only a partial responsibility in the exercise of the
money management function, and clearly did not provide a complete
guarantee of the convertibility of private bank money into state-
issued money.
In 1910, there were six substantial banks in S.A. (excluding the
1-branch Stellenbosch District Bank). By 1914, the National Bank had
absorbed 2 of these, and in 1920, the Standard Bank absorbed a third,
leaving only these two banks, and the Netherlands Bank. The
Standard and the ABC Bank (absorbed by the former in 1920) were
Imperial Banks - 'colonial banks financed by English capital and
directed from London1. They were tightly locked into the rest of
English finance capital. The National Bank had been established in
the Transvaal in 1891, as a joint venture of the South African
Republic state, gold-mining capital and other Transvaal concession-
aire. This form of partnership was continued after the Boer War. The
National (and presumably the Netherlands) had a 'London Committee',
including its manager in London, and (before 1925) one of the
directors of Barclays, which administered its London reserves.
Through their connections with 'The City' in London, the banks
ensured S.A.'s incorporation into the international and gold standard
and the system of trade and capital flows in the the pre-1914 period,
in which sterling was the 'hub currency', London the key centre, and
English financial capital the major beneficiary. Banking activities
fac ili tated internal trade, but especially flows of money and
commoditi es to and from the country. The banks had a branch
structure, with most payments made by cheque, and cleared in each town
in a mutually arranged clearing house. The development of 'credit
chains' meant that head offices had little control over increases in
credit extension in S.A., especially in rural areas. The banks
provided primarily circulation credit (as opposed to production
credit) in the form of advances and overdrafts to importers and
exporters.
The major S.A. export was of course raw gold bullion. Its steady
receipt by the Bank of Englagd was an integral feature of its opera-
tion of the gold standard. Symptomatic of the relation between
English financial capital and the S.A. economy was the fact that,
despite gold being 'the money material1, none was retained in S.A. for
local currency use. Instead, as with other S.A. exporters, the mines'
receipts from gold sales were deposited in their London accounts with
the S.A. banks. The latter had then to adjust their balances between
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London and S.A., partly by shipping (minted) gold back to S.A., much
of thisgcoin being used by the mines themselves to pay black workers1
wages.
The banks ensured the convertibility of their own currency into
gold sovereigns by ensuring that there were sufficient of the latter
on hand in South Africa. Without this, a run on the banks could have
resulted in bank failures, a general suspension of payments and wide-
spread bankruptcy. A situation developed where the largest imperial
bank, the Standard, held larger cash reserves than its own immediate
requirements dictated, to protect smaller banks in case of such a
run.
The need to maintain sufficient specie in South Africa itself and
thus for such a role to be played by the Standard was a result of the
geographical separation between S.A. and the banks' reserves in
London. These reserves lay behind their ability to maintain specie
reserves in S.A., and ship it to and from the country. They also
underpinned, with the banks' capital, their ability to borrow in the
London market, which was ultimately controlled by the Bank of England.
The banks kept their reserves in London precisely 'for the purpose of
being able to draw gold from London when it became necessary'.
This need arose when the South African balance of payments was in
surplus. The banks shipped coins to South Africa to maintain the
desired ratios between London and S.A. balances, and between gold
reserves in S.A. and deposits. In the South African case, the need to
ship specie was exacerbated by black workers' refusal to be paid in
anything but gold coin.
It was a deficit, however, in the balance of payments which could
create difficulties. If banks over-extended credit to importers, their
London balances would be reduced as they covered bills tendered in
London. If the balance dropped too much, and could not be compensated
by shipping specie from S.A. to London, the bank would be forced to
borrow in the London money market, which 'was extremely sensitive to
unusual increases in the volume of bills rediscounted by particular
banks or for particular trades or countries.' A limit to a bank's
borrowing in London led it to tighten its extension of credit in S.A.
Conversely, a general tightening of conditions in the London market,
i.e., a raising of Bank Rate, resulted in a raising of interest rates
by banks in South Africa. The Standard Bank (and presumably the other
banks) kept its schedule of interest rates in a constant relation with
Bank Rate in London.
Thus it was the London money market, in the first instance, and
the Bank of England ultimately, which regulated the convertibility of
private bank money to central bank money in S.A. The banks 'us[ed]
existing or acquir[ed] fresh resources [when London balances were too
low] ... fincluding] conceivably borrowing from the Bank of England
itself.
The South African banks were thus an integral part of the British
banking structure, reflecting S.A.'s 'colonial1 status which, in the
monetary sphere, continued unchanged after Union. As Williams puts
it.
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there was as little, or as much, reason for the overseas
banks in London to cut off credit automatically to their
customers in Latin America, Africa, or Australia in times
of 'strain* as for the domestic banks to respond similarly
to their customers in Birmingham, Manchester or Newcastle
... it is impossible to separate the then overseas Empire
banking system from the domestic British banking system,
and, to that extent, it is somewhat arbitrary to speak,
with regard to monetary movements, of a United Kingdom
balance of payments.
The last point applies equally to S.A. It is incorrect to consider
the banks' gLondon balances, during this period, as 'S.A.'s foreign
reserves1. These balances are better conceptualised as ordinary
banking reserves, their physical location in London enabling the Bank
of England to play its central banking role. As we shall see, this
approach makes it possible to locate the later establishment of the
S.A. Reserve Bank in the context of structural changes in S.A.
capitalism. -
In general, a relation is also required between the national
currency (central bank money) and some form of 'international money1.
Peripheral colonial economies do not however, require an 'internation-
al money1 in this sense. In the South African case, the exchange rate
between the South African £ and the £ sterling fluctuated between the
gold export points. This fluctuation related to the relative presence
or absence of gold coin in S.A., and the need to ship it physically,
which resulted in transport and insurance costs. These costs were
relatively constant before World War 1, so that the banks set the
exchange rate according to whether the transaction would bring them
closeryto, or move them further from, the need to actually ship
gold.
Thus the need to ship specie to S.A. because of its physical
separation from London led to a divergence between the S.A. £ and
sterling (their quantitative relation was no longer exactly 1:1). But
their 'exchange rate* under the gold standard was not a real rate
indicating the quantitative relation between their international
purchasing powers. As J.P. Gibson, general manager of the Standard
Bank, put it in 1920: "in South Africa, we have been on the basis of
pound for pound with England ... the rate at which business was done
was more of the nature of a commission than an exchange'. In other
words, S.A.'s •international money' was sterling, because S.A. was
still part of the British monetary system.
The physical separation between England and South Africa, was
bridged by flows of capital and commodities in both directions. The
sphere of monetary circulation reflected this. At the same time, the
fact that the two countries were separated implied that private bank
money in S.A. was articulated to the national currency in a different
way from that of banks whose operations were entirely within Britain,
even though the national currency - sovereigns - was the same for
both. Consequently, the S.A. national currency was articulated
differently to sterling as 'international money1 than the British
national currency. Under the smooth operation of the pre-war gold
standard, these differences were not relevant. But when the system was
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disrupted during the war, they produced problems in the monetary
sphere.
Ill
The outbreak of war in 1914 meant not only that special monetary
arrangements were required by the gold standard's disruption, but also
that English financial capital was significantly weakened by the
destruction of the entire system of international trade. The way was
thus open for a transformation of the relative strengths of different
capitals operating in S.A.
Higher shipping insurance rates, and the British government's
refusal to include gold in the war,risks insurance scheme, led to the
breaking of the link between gold and sterling. Following a year of
fluctuating rates, the British government pegged the exchange rate at
$4,76 3^16 from January 1916, as opposed to the pre-war rate of
$4,86. Furthermore, in order to keep gold within the Empire, and
given the leakage of gold out of South Africa, the British government
limited gold shipments to South Africa to small amounts. At the
same time, the South African government, in November 1914, banned gold
exports to particular European (enemy) ports. In December 1916f after
leakages of coin, combined with the difficulties of importing it, had
made the banks' position Uftry difficult, the government extended the
ban to all overseas ports.
When the pre-war gold-sterling link was broken, the banks
theoretically had the choice of keeping the SA £ linked to gold rather
than sterling. But given the pre-war monetary structure and direction
of trade flows, as well as the banks' connections with English
financial capital, it was hardly conceivable that they would opt for a
gold peg. The SA £ thus remained linked to sterling, with a fixed
remittance fee of 7/8%.
These new monetary arrangements contributed significantly to the
weakening of importers, who had been central to the hegemony of
'imperial capital1, during the war and immediate post-war period.
Import prices had increased substantially, nearly trebling between
1914 and 1920, due to sterling•s depreciation, reduced levels of
supply as overseas production was directed to the war effort, and
higher shipping and insurance costs. Some tariffs were also increased
by the S.A. government. Importers thus required larger advances
from the banks; however, to maintain the exchange rate peg and comply
with the ban on gold export, the banks restricted credit to importers.
Import volumes thus fell considerably, producing a balance of trade
surplus (Table 1).
The pegging of the exchange rate involved attempts to limit S.A.
exports, given the trade surplus. The banks were building up large
balances in London, partly due to the mines continuing to sell their
gold direct to the Bank of England. Under special wartime arrange-
ments, the S.A. banks held the gold until it could be conveniently
shipped. They were credited for its value by the Bank of England in
London, and in turn advanced the mines in S.A. 97% (later 98 3/4%) of
the gold's value. Thus their London balances rose, and could not be
adjusted because of the limit on specie exports to S.A. At some .npints
during the war, the banks refused to buy bills from exporters. It
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seems therefore that if it had been linked to gold, the S.A. £ would
certainly have appreciated against sterling during the war, so
reducing the returns to S.A. exporters. Among these the goldmines
were by far the most important, and their profits were already being
hit in other ways. Thus, the continuing link with sterling, though
damaging to importers, provided important relief to exporters.
The weakness of importers provided an environment of protection
within which manufacturing industry flourished. Both the value of
output (see Table 12) and the number of employees in industry more
than doubled in the four years from 1915/6. War-induced growth also
implied considerable diversification of the industrial structure, with
the beginnings of heavy industry. Thus the basis was laid for the
transformation of national capital from a small group of minor
manufacturers, no more than a class in embryo. But the industrial
development involved more than simply accumulation by small
manufacturers who in the pre-war period had been protectionist and
nationalist. Many of these were, of course, able to capture
substantial shares of their own markets and/or move into new markets.
Perhaps more significant, however, was the participation in
industry, starting during the war and immediate post-war period, of
the banks and (some) mining capital. These two core groups within im-
perial capital began to move away from their almost-total orientation
to resource extraction and trade, in response to pressures on their
existing profit bases, and the simultaneous appearance of new oppor-
tunities.
While goldmining capitalists had made an initial entry into
industry before the War, it was only under the impetus of rising
costs, excess capacity _and falling profitability (a drop of 42%
between 1913 and 1919) that this move became consolidated. Unit
cost increases were due to higher freight and insurance rates, labour
shortages and worker militancy pushing up wages, and shortages of
imported material pushing up prices of inputs, both those still
imported and those now locally produced. The increased credit ex-
pansion by the banks (see below) permitted these and other inflation-
ary pressures to be propagated through the economy, thus compounding
the cost problems.
Promotion of industrial development in S.A. was seen by the mining
companies as a means of reducing both costs and dependence on im-
ports. This related especially to industries which produced
necessary inputs for the mines, amongst which iron and steel were
foremost. The Union Steel Corporation, established by the Lewis and
Marks mining house before the war, was able to consolidate itself and
expand during the war, as demand for its output increased. Administra-
tion of the company was transferred from London to Johannesburg in
1918, this and the expansion of capacity suggesting a renewed
commitment to it by the mining house, as well as a desire to obtain
S.A. state support. 3
Mining capital was also moving into industry because it offered,
at least potentially, levels oft profitability which no longer seemed
generally available in mining. Consolidated Gold Fields "had seen the
revenue from its three big mines reduced by 85% in the seven years
ending in 1918, so that the Chairman felt that 'mining in S.A. is not
a tempting adventure in these days.1" The company had earlier sought
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mining investments outside S.A., and now became interested in indus-
trial investment in S.A. itself, acquiring control over a diversi-
fied group of enterprises.
Similarly, in 1920, Ernest Oppenheimer stated that the intention
of the recently-established Anglo-American Corporation was 'to inves-
tigate any attractive industrial investment that presents itself and
not merely confine its activities to mining enterprise1. Oppen-
heimer here and generally presented himself not as a rising capital-
ist, but as a S.A. economic nationalist with a major priority the
industrial development of the country. E.A. Wallers, local director
of Central Mining and Chamber of Mines President (1914, 1916-19, 1924)
was also interested in establishing a national base for capital
accumulation in S^., through the National Industrial Corporation
(discussed below).
There were clearly sound economic reasons behind the move by local
mining men into industry, a move which was connected to the industry's
increasing 'South Africanisation*. Nevertheless their ability to
make this move, and thereby assert a greater independence from the
English financiers who had previously called the tune, reflected, I
would argue, the latter group's much-weakened situation. This
followed the destruction of the international gold standard and all
that entailed, the British debt to the U.S. as a result of war-
financing needs, and the rise of New York as an international
financial centre.
Unable to prevent the development of manufacturing industry and
the associated greater independence and alternative orientation on the
part of local mining capitalists, English finance capital was forced
to accept and adapt to it, by trying to shape the new situation as
best as possible to its advantage. One way of doing so was to view
S.A. manufacturing industry as an outlet for investment and a market
for British exports of capital goods and other inputs necessary for
its development. Increases in both exports and dividends from
foreign capital investment were essential to the restoration of
strength to the ailing British balance of payments, and thereby to
•The City's' international position.
The S.A. banks were of course the best placed within financial
capital to obtain immediate benefit from industrial expansion, given
that a primary need in the expansion was for_ credit. Thus they
financed much of it via loans and overdrafts. Since the banks had
at times during the war to restrict credit to both importers and ex-
porters, it was clearly in their interests (with respect to profit-
ability) to advance funds to manufacturers instead. There was keen
competition between th% banks to obtain the accounts of newly-
established enterprises. In 1917 the National Bank, perhaps because
of its greater distance from 'The City1 and thus more 'national1
orientation, but surely also to obtain a competitive edge over the
Standard, went much further, by setting up with some mining houses the
Industrial Development Company, to provide long-term capital to
industrial firms. 'In 1919, E.C. Reynolds, manager of the National
Bank of S.A., proposed that the state should also cultivate an
"atmosphere of industrial investment" ... the Industrial Development
Company and the National Bank of S.A. formed the enlarged National
Industrial Corporation of S.A. Limited, with £1 million capital to
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fulfill [the] needs [of private industry].1
The credit being provided by the banks to industry was production
credit, as opposed to the circulation credit extended to commerce,
even though the instrument used (the overdraft) was the same. The
expansion of manufacturing thus implied a change (extension) in the
economic role of private bank money, a situation that was of some
concern to the banks. What was also needed, it seemed, was a
transformation in the nature of credit control.
Relative to cash reserves (coin and bullion), bank credit
increased substantially during the war and post-war years (the boom
during the latter period meant that the absolute increase in credit
was also significant). (See Table 3, columns 3 and 4). This reduction
in reserve ratios seems to have been unavoidable from the banks1
perspective, given the difficulties of moving gold, and the need to
expand credit to maintain production of export commodities (especially
gold) and boost production of manufacturers (capital and consumption
goods) to replace unavailable imports. Only through such monetary
accommodation could a 'generalised crisis' have been avoided, and the
cost of this accommodation was inflation, a reduction in the rate of
convertibility between private bank money and the national currency
(the sovereign). Whatever the necessity of the banks' actions, they
were subjected during 1919 and early 1920 to increasing public
criticism for overissue of their notes, which was seen to have caused
the inflation.
This was combined with pressure for the government to introduce
new legislation involving tighter controls over the banks in relation
to note-issue. The banks• response was that their increased note
issue was commensurate with the higher circulation needs of the
economy, which was booming. They blamed the inflation on their in-
ability to obtain sufficient gold for reserve purposes, as a result of
government wartime regulations and subsequent government jmaction in
obtaining gold for local currency directly from the mines.
Whatever the merits of their argument, the persistence of
inflation through these years meant that the perceived inadequacy of
credit control had become an important political issue.
IV
The special monetary arrangements and other wartime circumstances,
followed by the postwar boom, were thus beginning to place
considerable stress on, and lead to suggestions for reform of, the
'internal relation1 (private bank money - national currency) within
the overall monetary structure. The 'external relation1 between the
national currency and 'international money', came under similar
pressure in the immediate postwar period.
Before the war, the S.A. Banks had only had to maintain the
convertibility relation (quantitative and qualitative) between private
bank money and state money. Together with maintenance of a similar
relation between sterling and gold by the Bank of England, this
•automatically1 regulated the relation between the S.A. £ and ster-
ling. During the war, howeer, with the change in the sterling-gold
relation
 f the S.A. banks had to maintain the two relations (S.A.
£-gold; S.A. £-£) separately. Under conditions of restricted gold
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flows, this could only be done via inflation. But this separation of
the two relationships also separated the S.A. £ and sterling, in the
sense that sterling now became a true 'international money1 relative
to the SA £ - the apparent exchange rate became a real one : 'the
stability [of the exchange] was fictitious, the banks were refusing to
do business^ at quoted rates [to prevent increases in their London
balances].'
As G. de Kock points out (p 11), this separation 'caused no
trouble as long as sterling was maintained close to mint parity with
the gold dollar1. However, in March 1919, the British Government,
facing its own difficulties, decided that the support for sterling at
$4,76 7/16 was too costly, and ceased to peg the rate. It immediately
dropped markedly, given British wartime inflation and London's decline
as an international financial centre. The gold price expressed in
sterling thus rose to a premium, which reached 4556 in February 1920.
The goldmines were able to take advantage of this premium from
July 1919, when they were allowed by the Bank of England, after
considerable appealing, to sell their output (excluding the amount
required for South African currency use) on the free market. The
premium was of course essential to the survival of several mines,
given the industry's profitability problems, and its later fall led
to attempts by the mines to cut costs. These ultimately resulted in
the 1922 strike by white mineworkers, which event is widely discussed
in the literature.
For the banks, as opposed to the mines
 t the gold premium was a
potential disaster. It reflected a reduction in the rate of convert-
ibility between the country's 'international money* (sterling) and its
national currency (the sovereign, seen as a certain weight of gold),
just as inflation in S.A. reflectd a similar change in the internal
monetary relation. But because S.A. remained internally on the gold
standard, the premium produced a situation where substantial arbitrage
profits could be made, as described in the introduction. Inside S.A.,
the sovereign was a token representing £1 and obtainable in exchange
for a bank note; in fact the amount of gold in the sovereign was now
worth much more than £1, both inside and outside the country. With
the premium on sterling, this difference could now be realised by
selling the sovereign, as a lump of gold, outside S.A. Coin smuggling
became increasingly sophisticated, and enormous amounts of gold left
the country. The banks had to continue providing specie in exchange
for notes and deposits. Furthermore, the need to pay black workers in
specie provided a major reason for continued imports, since much of
these payments disappeared into the rest of Southern Africa, or out of
circulation into hoards. If the banks were forced to obtain their
specie at the world market price, the situation could clearly not
continue for any length of time without leading to bank failures and
thus suspension of monetary payments.
While the banks were able to obtain their specie at the nominal
value of 20s, or 77/9d- per ounce, the premium itself was not a
particularly new problem for them, despite the substantial leakage of
coin out of the country. It was only after the signing of the new
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gold-marketing agreement in July 1919 that the potential disaster
represented by the premium became a reality. Under this agreement,
the Bank of England would supply sovereigns for overseas shinment, by
paying with them for gold bullion valued at 77/9 per ounce. Also,
the S.A. government was able to requisition, on behalf of the banks,
an amount of bullion equivalent to local currency requirements, for
resale to the Bank of England. The effect of the premium on the banks
thus turned on the price at which they could obtain this bullion. It
was an issue which placed them and the mines on opposite sides of the
fence: if the government requisition was at the standard price, the
banks would benefit at the expense of the mines' loss of the premium
on that proportion of their output; if the banks had to pay the free-
market price, they would be placed in a dilemma.
On the one hand, they could break the link between sterling and
the S.A.£, thereby allowing the latter to move upwards (closer to gold
par), so as to recover part of the premium. This option had costs,
however: it would le&d to a •serious disturbance of the country's
trade and industry,' having in particular a detrimental effect on
the goldmines,
 7#ho would lose a corresponding fraction of their
premium income. In addition, this approach would be difficult to
manage, with both the New York-London exchange (determining the
premium) and the S.A.-London exchange fluctuating. The banks' inex-
perience in managing fluctuating exchange rates made this path even
more risky. The banks' alternative, however, was to maintain the
sterling peg and allow the profitability crisis to continue. To add to
the complexities, the banks feared that too much pressure on the
government to assist them with the currency would further fuel the
fires of support for the policy of government (rather than private
bank) note-issue, and even for a 'Government Bank.1
The impact of the gold premium, and the associated renegotiation
of the gold-marketing system, on the monetary system was thus not
simply forcing the banks to react, but also beginning to indicate the
need for its overall restructuring. An additional development, which
constributed to this, in the first half of 1919 was the granting to
the S.A. government of the power to set up a branch of the Royal Mint
able to deal with the entire local gold output. At the same time, the
Chamber of Mines was allowed to establish a refinery on the Rand.
The mines had been advocating the establishment of a refinery in
S.A. since at least late 1917. This was not supported by those
elements who remained tied more closely to 'The City1. As Phillips
pointed out, for the Central Mining Corporation, 'it would necessitate
an entire reorganisation of our financial arrangements, as the money
received against the gold would have to be dealt with on your side [in
S.A.] or transferred to London at the current rates of exchange.1
Thus the refinery expressed, and would contribute further to, the
increasing localisation of the goldmining industry.
The envisaged Hint was also seen by the Chamber to be highly
advantageous, and not simply because it 'would secure a haljjrark for
S.A. gold, facilitating its disposal throughout the world.1 More
importantly, the Chamber saw the two planned institutions as part of
the permanent solution to the cost problems which was the premium
temporarily resolving. The refinery and Mint together would make a
direct contribution to reduced marketing costs, by resulting in
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•reduced refinery charges, and also, it [was] hoped, in-relieving the
mines of the charges for freight and insurance of gold.1
Though the primary motive may have been to relieve cost pressures,
the Mint and refinery would obviously affect the monetary sphere also.
They would, in the long-run, serve the interests of the banks, who had
themselves proposed in ^ 912-13 that a Mint be set up to reduce their
need to import specie. Based on the same reasoning, gold required
for local currency was excluded from the July 1919 marketing
agreement, to be channelled to the local Mint once it was in opera-
tion. In principle, the Mint thus offered a way out of the banks'
dilemma - if they could obtain specie from the new Mint at the Mint
price, the premium would not have been a problem for them.
But the Mint was not yet operating. And when the banks approached
the government in August over the bullion requisition, they found that
the government had neglected to specify in the agreement either the
price at which bullion would be requisitioned, or the interim arrange-
ments prior to the Mint' s opening. Since it • was clear that the
Government were unquestionably committed to the [gold marketing]
scheme', the banks as a group were forced to negotiate with the
Chamber through the government, over the terms of the requisition. At
this stage, the banks were clearly not ready either to delink with
sterling, or to try to force the state to take responsibility for the
currency. Their approach was to avoid the potential dilemma by
pushing the cost onto the mines.
These negotiations initiated a policy process aimed at monetary
restructuring, which led eventually to the passing of the Currency and
Banking Act the following August. During what can be distinguished as
the first phase of this process, lasting until December, the concerns
of the banks were by and large rejected not only by the mines, but
also by the state, which accepted the latter group's opposed interests
as predominant.
 fi
The banks' argument was that the primary need for specie in S.A.
resulted from the mines paying their workers in gold, and the leakage
of coin out of the country or into hoards, when the migrant labourers,
especially those from Mozambique, returned home. Thus, they felt, the
mines should pay the cost of the premium on local currency, and their
offer was to pay the standard Bank of England price (77/9 per ounce).
The mines rejected this, arguing that the banks should raise their
exchange charges (commissions) to spread the cost over all exporters.
As the weeks passed, the issue remained unresolved, until the banks
realised that the state was 'loth to coerce the Mining Industry',
and they would have to buy their bullion on the open market.
They were still, in mid-November, not prepared to unpeg the S.A.£.
from sterling because of the damaging economic effects - the post-
war boom, from which they were making good profits, would be turned
into a recession. Thus the focus of the dispute between the banks and
the Chamber shifted to the issue of exchange charges, as the banks
attempted to recoup some of the cost of the premium. Even though the
mines were offered preferential rates (and had earlier proposed
precisely this course to the banks), they refused to accept the
proposed new schedule. They backed this up with threats that they
would instead set up their own foreign exchange department, and hinted
that they were involved in discussions to this purpose with banks in
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New York and London. Reflecting their dependence on the mines'
accounts and exchange business, the banks relented, feeling 'it would
be better to concede favourable terms rather than risk the consequen-
ces of a rupture with the Chamber.1 The banks' initial strategy to
deal with the currency situtaion thus ended in failure.
Throughout these negotiations, the state had supported the mines,
arguinggghat 'it was for the Banks to protect themselves as best they
could't by raising their charges. The only concession offered was
that more vigorous attempts would be made to reduce the leakage of
coins from" the country.
As far as the 'currency and exchange problem' was concerned, the
Chamber, like everyone else, supported as a long-run objective a
return to the full gold standard, which would involve free movement of
gold into and out of the country. But in the short-run, the continua-
tion of the premium was primary. Their other immediate monetary
concern was the high rate of inflation and its effect on the cost of
living, and the cost of supplies. This they attributed to over-issue
of money and credit by the banks, and the most pressing consequence
was the stirrings of worker pressure for wage increases. As Sir
Evelyn Wallers, the Chamber's president, expressed it, in early
December, to the Standard Bank's Deputy General Manager:
The high premium paid for gold has saved the position and
to-day the Rand is enjoying extraordinary prosperity ...
but money is circulating too freely to be altogether
healthy. Under these prosperous conditions while labour
is again showing signs of restlessness; native labour is
much below the complement required and is dissatisfied but
lacks cohesion.
The extent to which the Chamber's priorities shaped the state's
thinking on monetary restructuring during this firstflcj>hase became
clear at the 'Gold Conference1 it convened in October. It invited
the general managers of the four banks,'three representatives of the
Chamber, representatives of the political parties, and three
•interested individuals'. The purpose was to consider whether S.A.
could, and should, return to the full gold standard at pre-war par,
this already ruling out consideration of the temporary suspension of
the nominal standard (ie eliminating convertibility inside the
country), the only move which would resolve the banks' problems.
The central debate was between an immediate return to the full
standard, involving a lifting of the embargo on exports of specie, and
the delay of this return until the opening of the Mint and the
refinery. The former position was taken up in vigorous fashion by J.W.
Jagger MPt who was a protfninent importer, as well as by the represent-
atives of the Labour and Nationalist Parties. An immediate return to
par would clearly benefit importers, who having suffered through the
war, now wished to regain lost ground by cheapening imports via an
appreciating S.A.£. against sterling. Jagger's main argument however,
was that cheaper imports would lower the cost of living, a position in
line with the Nationalist and Labour Party members. The latter pointed
also to the potential political threat. J.G. van der Horst, one of the
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 interested individuals' and a longtime Nationalist supporter and
member of the the •national bourgeoisie, pointed to the exports of
food at a time of rising living costs. This, if continued , would lead
to 'an upheaveal1. In addition, 'no manufacturers or industries could
be carried on unless the food of the people were [sic] relatively
cheap ... Wages would eat up all profits1.
Whatever their concern about possible 'upheavals' as a result of
inflation, the continuation of the premium was literally the bottom
line for the mines, and they took the opposing position. A return to
the full gold standard, they argued, by S.A. without Britain, depended
on the existence of the Mint and refinery. The path to lower prices
thus lay through these establishments, which would therefore be of
benefit not only to the mines, but also to 'the community by bringing
about a reduction in the cost of living through tlje. favourable effect
on the rate of exchange which is likely to ensue.1 Without them, on
the other hand, a return to 'natural exchange1 (par) 'would create a
great deal of disturbance1, to the gold mining industry in particular.
Once refined gold was available in S.A., however, the mines would be
able to obtain the premium (if it still existed) by selling directly
on the free market. Thus a return to gold would be possible as soon
as the Mint and refinery opened.
The banks supported the Chamber against an immediate return, on
the grounds that 65% of the premium income would be lost (this being
the proportion of locally used working capital to total output). In
addition, it would result in a capital outflow from S.A. One conse-
quence would be, as Reynolds argued, a 'tendency to strangle the
budding manufacturers of the Union', implying that wage demands would
be easier to deal with than competition from imports. Banking support
for the mines was limited to the issue of an immediate return, however
they did not agree that a Mint and refinery were sufficient to allow a
return to a full standard, and opposed this section of the final
resolution. But they found no support at all for their own proposal
'that the prohibition [on the export of specie] remain until
conditions became more normal1, that is, until a deflation had brought
the exchange rate closer to pre-war gold parity.
In contrast, the majority at th| conference, including those who
had called for an immediate return, supported the formal resolution
proposed by Oppenheimer, to lift the embargo immediately upon the
Mint's opening. The state accepted the mines' emphasis on the role of
the Mint and refinery in monetary restructuring, together with the
subsidiary proposal that banking legislation be unified and tighten up
on the possibility of note overissue. (This latter proposal was ,/
accepted by the banks). Reynolds had argued at the conference that
the coin leakage could be adequately resolved only by making the
bank's notes inconvertible while the premium lasted. The Standard
Bank did not give him support on this - although they surely must have
agreed in principle, they felt the proposal had no broader support,
and were worried about antagonising the other participants and the
State. This feeling was borne out by the conference's hostile
reaction to Reynolds' suggestion - any hint of total abandonment of
gold raised very strong political feelings. Reflecting its unwilling-
ness to take such a politically unpopular step at this point, the
government's rej ection of inconvertibility immediately after the
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conference was equally firm: • the Government does not favour the
Banks' remedy of a temporarily inconvertible note issue, and there is
no likelihood of its adoption now or later1. The justification for
this was the fear ttiat an inconvertible note issue would inevitably
produce inflation.
VI
Despite its firm rejection of inconvertibility after the Gold
Conference, only three months later in early February, the government
had accepted in principle not only a refined temporary inconvert-
ibility scheme for the short-run, but also the need for more permanent
restructuring via the establishment of a central bank. This reversal
of perspective distinguishes the second phase of monetary restructur-
ing from the first. The banks' immediate interests now predominated,
having become identified with the general interest (of the capitalist
class at least). Linked to this, there was a shift in focus from
inflation as the central monetary problem, to the monetary effects of
the gold premium and its possible elimination; the shift, in other
words, was from a primary concern with the internal monetary relation
to concern with the external monetary relation.
This latter shift, and the state's new position, was linked to the
intervention in the policy process of Henry Strakosch, who had arrived
from London in December. As indicated above, his individual role has
been seen in the literature as providing an adequate explanation of
the state's turnaround. The process was considerably more complex,
however, even if the state would be apt to accept Strakosch's advice,
having invited his help in the first place. A more detailed
examination is required of the reaching of consensus among the
different groupings within 'imperial capital' - the mines, the banks
and English financial capital in particular.
The details of the actual formulation of policy during this period
can be briefly rehearsed. Following Strakosch's arrival and initial
consultation with Smuts, his proposals were incorporated into the
draft bills being developed by the Treasury following the Gold
Conference. After a meeting in early February between the banks and
Farrer, the Secretary for Finance, these bills were considered by a
specially constituted Advisory Committee on Currency and Banking
Reform, composed of delegates from all the various capitalist
representative bodies. Detailed consideration of the bills was under-
taken by a sub-committee involving only the •imperial capitalist•
groupings - the Chamher of Mines, the banks and Assocom, as well as
Strakosch and Farrer. The revised draft bills were then sent on to
Parliament, where an all-party Select Committee, on the Embargo on
Export of Specie (SC2-'20), heard evidence from members of the
Advisory Committee, as well as others. Having consolidated the two
bills into one, with a few minor changes, the bill passed into
legislation as the Currency and Banking Act of 1920. Through this
process of negotiation, compromise and concession on details was made
possible. The basic approach, however, was not altered, once it had
proven acceptable to the three major groupings.
English financial capital was represented in this process by
Strakosch, the invitation to whom was not simply fortuitous but
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reflected this group's presence as a class force in South Africa.
Strakosch himself headed one of S.A.'s mining houses in London, and
also had a long association with international banking in 'The
City1. Furthermore, he had close connections with two important
individuals in English monetary policy circles - J.M. Keynes and
Montagu Norman, Governor (from 1920) of the Bank of England.
Strakosch's views on the S.A. 'currency and exchange problem1 reflec-
ted their influence.
Smut's request came at a moment when English financial capital had
begun to get increasingly concerned about the deteriorating situation
of the banks, and especially about the possibility of S.A. returning
to the full gold standard prior to Britain. As Henry puts it:
London ... had become apprehensive of a serious break
in the exchange, now that S.A. and the U.K. were no longer
based on the same standard of value. If the Union Govern-
ment would not, and the S.A. banks could not, effectively
intervene, it looked as though the exchange rate would be
forced to a point corresponding with the cost of importing
gold [to par], with the result that South African industry
would be stifled and capital would go elsewhere.
This of course was precisely what the banks had been arguing. If a
crisis was precipitated in South Africa, English capital would lose a
major portion of its investment, and also its major source of gold*
The Bank of England would go to very great lengths to protect its
influence over the S.A. mining industry: 'it was one of the last that
he [Norman] would have allowed to pass out of British control.'
Strakosch's intervention, as evidenced by his pamphlet, The South
African Currency and Exchange Problem, written at Smuts' request, and
his lengthy evidence to the Select Committee, was clearly designed
to forestall any premature return by S.A. to the gold standard. In
doing so he developed in detail many of the points the banks had made
earlier. He argued strenuously against the view that inflation in S.A.
was simply the result of over-extension of bank credit, and would be
resolved by a return to the full gold standard, with or without the
Mint and refinery. Pointing out that 'the rise in prices is world-
wide ' (SC2-20, q. 151), he argued that inflation was not simply a
monetary phenomenon, but involved also jforces affecting production,
distribution and consumption (CEP, 26). Thus, 'without increased
production and economy, the expedient of raising our [S.A.'s] exchange
to gold par is not going to solve the difficulty but will simply tend
to produce a financial crisis' (SC2-20, q 152).
The removal of the embargo to enable a return to par would, he
felt, damage the economy in a number of different ways. Firstly, it
would induce a subtantial withdrawal of English capital, as well as a
possible outflow of S.A. capital, as the S.A.£.'s appreciation against
sterling made investment in the latter more attractive. Potential
new inflows of capital would dry up. Strakosch1s concern here was not
only that S.A.'s economic development might be held back, but also the
possibility that capital from other countries might move in to fill
the gap, thereby weakening English financial capital's influence over,
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and base of profitability in, the country. The danger here was from
the U.S. in particular, which had maintained the gold-dollar link, so
that an appreciation of the S.A.£. would make the country more
attractive to American investors. Although Strakosch argued that U.S.
capital would not move in becuase the U.S. itself remained too
attractive an investment area, the emphatic nature of his argument
betrays some concern at the possibility (CEP, ). Other contemporary
commentators, some of them hopefully, saw it as a real possibility.
The UCT economist Robert Leslie, for example, noted that 'there are
indications that American financiers are taking an interest in the
development of [our] mineral resources ... Unless however our currency
is soon restored to the gold standard basis, we cannot expect that
much capital will come from the US.1
Strakosch's argument about imports was similar. A rise in the
S.A.£. would clearly cheapen imports generally. But as other
witnesses to the S.C. pointed out, it would at the same time improye
the competitive position of American imports, compared to British.
This would reinforce the existing trends towards increasing trade
links with the U.S., and reduce flows to and.from Britain.
As far as both capital and commodity flows were concerned,
therefore, the maintenance of the embargo, while sterling was
depreciated against gold and the dollar, was essential from English
financial capital's perspective. The S.A.£. had to remain linked to
sterling, to protect this group's already weakened hold over S.A.
There was also a need to protect existing investments. No-one had to
be reminded of the 'truly disastrous consequences' (CEP, 22) for the
gold mines of a return to par. But what Strakosch emphasised also was
the effects of lifting the embargo on other exporters and on South
Africa's import-competing industries. The former would experience a
sudden drop in their receipts (in terms of S.A.£.), and the latter
significantly increased competition from now-cheapened exports (CEP,
21). This rapid deflation would force producers in both groups to
attempt to cut their costs, particularly wage-costs, which would be
fiercely resisted. The economy would be forced into recession, with
firms and farmers going bankrupt, mines being closed down, and workers
being laid off. The threat of unemployment would eventually force
down wages. But the divergence between the 'almost instantaneous1
effect on prices and the 'long and laborious process' of reducing
wages and other costs
may well have a most serious effect upon all manner of
production in the Union. The farming industry and the
newly established local manufacturing industries which
were able to progress under the protection of high prices
engendered by the war, would experience a setback from
which they (and especially the latter) might find,
 1 £
difficult to recover for a great many years (CEP, 22) 114
What is reflected here is not only a desire to protect British
investment from the inevitably damaging effects (including possible
political upheaval) of a generalised recession in S.A., but also an
implicit acceptance of, and even support for, local manufacturing
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industries. English financial capital was prepared to adapt to, and
profit from, the latter, rather than seeing them destroyed.
Strakosch thus argued that the return to par would produce the
deflationary effect desired by those supporting it, but the cost made
it not worthwhile. But, he argued further, the S.A.£. could not be
maintained at par (SC2-2O, q 204). The increasing deficit on the
balance of payments which would follow the return would be such as to
push the exchange rate downwards again. Thus the attempt to return to
par would prove a vain exercise.
It was not sufficient, however, merely to avoid an early return to
gold at par, in order to protect English financial capital's interests
in S.A. If the banks were forced to continue importing specie at the
premium price, they would soon begin to raise their exchange rate and
limit their credit extensions, in order to protect themselves. This
was what in fact happened from January (see below). The effect of
these actions, Strakosch recognised (CEP, p 11; SC2-20, q. 240), would
be similar to, if not so drastic as, a return to gold. The immediate
need therefore was to secure the banks from a withdrawal of their
reserves (SC2-20, q. ). This had to be achieved so as to allow also
for a gradual deflation to enable a return to gold at par at some
future date.
The gold certificates scheme supported by Strakosch was perfectly
suited to this purpose. This scheme involved the withdrawal of
sovereigns from circulation, to be replaced by 'gold certificates1 in
a one-for-one basis. The Certificates would be legal tender, but
there would be no incentive to smuggle or hoard them, as they had no
intrinsic value. They would be used as long as the premium existed.
Moving the responsibility for the national currency from the
government to the banks, the gold certificates completely eliminated
the problems involved in maintaining the relation between private bank
money and the national currency, by the simple expedient of changing
the state-issued money. The problem for the private banks, so far as
this relation was concerned, now was no longer to maintain a rate of
exchange between the S.A.£. and the weight of gold in a sovereign, but
merely to prevent inflation by avoiding overextension of credit. The
gold certificates themselves had no direct impact on either the
exchange rate or the inflation rate - they did not contribute to
any sudden deflation. Neither could they lead to inflation via their
over-issue, since they had to be fully backed by gold, which, while
the premium lasted and the certificates were necessary, cost more than
the latter's nominal value.
In explaining this to the Select Committee, Strakosch at the same
time indicated that English financial capital identified the banks'
immediate interests and the general interest:
q 2 698. [The gold certificates] will neither depreciate
nor appreciate our money? - No, they will simply lock up
your gold,
q 2 699. And thereby save the banks? - And the country.
The gold certificates scheme was seen to be merely adequate, in
that it dealt with the immediate problem. More fundamental monetary
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restructuring was required, to defend the situation for the longer
term:
q. 240. ... We have to look further [than the certif-
icates]. There is bound to be a crisis. Commodity prices
are bound to come down, and falling prices always mean
crisis? Today the banks are not, even with their reserves
secured in the shape of gold certificates. Even if they
imported a further 1 % million in gold, that would only
give them a reserve of something like 8%, which is
entirely inadquate to back their huge liabilities to
depositors ...
A central bank was therefore required to deal with the imminent
and subsequent crises. The key feature it would provide, a feature
heavily emphasised by Strakosch, was the centralisation of banking
reserves. With reserves decentralised they could not be properly used
when most urgently required - during a run on a bank - since all banks
had then to hold on to their own reserves at all costs. The first
bank, able to use only its own reserves for protection, might soon
collapse, spreading the panic. In contrast, the 'reserves centralised
in one institution could, when an emergency arises, be used to the
full in order to stop the fire [at its source] and thus avoid a
conflagration' (q 225).
The other essential element of the monetary system including a
central bank was the creation of a second tier of liquid assets - dis-
countable bills - which the banks could convert into additional
reserves in case of emergency. When necessary, the commercial banks
could rediscount their bills of exchange with the central bank, to
improve their reserve ratios. 'The banks most legitimate investment -
discounts - become its quickest asset1 (q 225). At the same time, the
central bank would receive a signal to raise its discount rate,
thereby leading to a general contraction, stabilising the economy (q
255).
Strakosch•s emphasis on these two features contains an implicit
acknowledgement of the new monetary realities of the post-war period.
Before 1914, as I discussed in Section II, the S.A. banks' reserves
had been centralised in London, they had discounted bills in the
London money market, and the Bank of England stood behind as the
centrl bank. Thus the argument for a central bank in S.A. suggests
that the Bank of England could no longer play this role, due to the
disruption of the pre-war system and the associated weakening of 'The
City1, and to the Bank of England's own need to focus on getting
Britain back onto the gold standard. The S.A. state had to take on
responsibility for local monetary regulation.
This understanding is reinforced by the argument made by Farrer,
the Secretary for Finance, in his own testimony to the S.C., which
endorsed Strakosch's views in every respect. Farrer pointed out
that without a central bank, • there is a limit to legitimate and
desirable expansion of credit by the banks ... as S.A. will have to
look largely to itself in the future, it is almost essential to make a
change in order to provide capital necessary to carry out the
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development of the country1 (q. 3 660t emphasis added).
The reference to capital requirements here appears to be to the
need for a controlled expansion of credit to allow further industrial
and other development. This was emphasised also by Strakosch, who
compared S.A. with the U.S.: 'Authorities say that if America had
adopted the central banking system fifty years earlier, its [indus-
trial] progress would have been infinitely greater, because [it] would
have been saved the retarding effect of these periodical destructions
of credit and confidence1 (SC2-20, q. 264). He thus rejected the
criticism that S.A.'s level of development was too low to justify a
central bank, pointing instead to the boost which a reorganisation of
the credit system could give to capital accumulation.
The pre-war gold standard system had revolved around trade, so
that the role of the Bank of England in credit control was linked to
the predominance of foreign trade in S.A. Since the intention and
hope of EnaUsh financial capital was to restore eventually the pre-
war system, Strakosch's advocacy of a central bank suggests also a
recognition that foreign trade, if still dominant, was no longer the
only important feature of the S.A. economy. It was a recognition, in
other words, of the beginnings of the shift to industry and the
associated growing importance of national capital. What was needed,
for this reason too, was monetary regulation, which was not only
local, but of a different kind than before. This was linked to the
differences in the nature of credit involved - circulation vs produc-
tion, short-term vs. long-term: 'What does produce danger by immobil-
ising the bank are long loans, extending over several months' (SC2-20,
q 232; see also q 235).
Thus, English finance capital's support for a central bank was a
realistic assessment of the situation (in their own terms), and an
attempt to ensure that their profits, supplies and influence were not
completely destroyed. Plumptre puts this well: 'The desire in England
for a chain of Empire central banks was a latter day expression of
financial imperialism ... the essential purpose was the same: the
maintenance of London's influence and control.1 This 'desire' was
acted upon by the Bank of England, which was 'concerned to see that
British creditors gain[ed] the protection of sound financial policy in
the various debtor countries ...[including] insistence upon sanctity
of contrasts ... The Bank's desire [for these assurances] ... may well
explain why it was so anxio^ that the central banks in the Dominions
should be "independent"' of governments and particularistic
political aims. This latter point was stressed by Strakosch (SC2-'2O,
q 308, 310).
The Bank of England's direct hand is discernible, in Strakosch's
intervention. As already noted, Strakosch and Montagu Norman had a
very close connection from the early 1920s and so quite possibly at
this time too. Furthermore, a close advisor to Norman in the 1930s,
involved in establishing central banks in the other Dominions,
suggested that it was 'thanks to.,
had established a central
maintain British influence without visible "strings".'"'"" His ability
to do so was certainly enhanced by the appointment later in 1920 of W.
Clegg, the South African-born Chief Accountant of the Bank of England,
i to M s [Norman's] prompting [that S.A.]
bank.' 'By this means, [Norman] hoped to
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122to be the Reserve Bank's first Governor.
English financial capital's influence over S.A. monetary regula-
tion could thus be maintained, despite the establishment of the
Reserve Bank. But London had been moved to act to defend its position
by the increasingly apparent inability of the S.A. Banks to perform
this task of regulation adequately. The reaction of the S.A. banks to
their deteriorating situation from the start of 1920 can be seen as
having influenced the state's new policy directly as well.
The banks had, in early December, still not been willing to move
the S.A.£. appreciably away from sterling (though they had raised
their commission rates). However, the pressure on them to do so began
to mount quickly from then on, and not sijnply because of specie
leakage, which was becoming more organised. The situation was
becoming greatly complicated by the mounting balance of trade surplus
(see figures for 1919 in Table 1). This meant that their London
balances were accumulating too rapidly, and to adjust the situation,
they would have had to ship specie to S.A. Thus, accommodating export-
ers meant they were converting sterling into S.A.£. at par (or close
to it), but .making the reverse transaction (sterling into specie for
shipment) at a premium of 20-30%. As Gibson explained to the S.C.:
•We do not want to send money to London. If you accumulate balances
in London at 8% [the discount the banks had begun to charge on sterl-
ing by the time the S.C. sat], you may have to bring them back at 25%
[the gold premium on sterling]1 (q. 1 545).
This situation could not continue indefinitely, and from late
January, the banks began not only to increase the sterling discount
against the S.A.E., but also to refuse to accept exporters1 bills*
Purchases of bills by the Standard Bank's branches were rationed. A
1
 true' exchange rate between the two currencies thus developed. . At
the same time, the banks raised interest and discount rates in S.A.
The Government became concerned at the situation, and tried to per-
suade the banks to accept all bills, so as to encourage a return to
1
 normal conditions'. The banks refused, and maintained their
policy of limiting exports. Over the next three months, they raised
the sterling discount, which reached 8% by late April (when the S.C.
was sitting).
The banks' actions, including their refusal to follow the govern-
ment's injunction, served to highlight the seriousness of their situa-
tion, and the urgen need for a more appropriate policy response than
had been forthcoming during 1919. Although the gold certificates
scheme would not directly affect the buildup of their London balances,
it would reduce the pressure by relieving them of the burden of the
internal monetary relation, as well as the cost of the premium.
The exchange situation itself required more gradual treatment, and
through the rest of 1920, the banks' actions helped to turn the trade
surplus into a deficit, and also promoted an outflow of funds from the
country. Their London balances were thereby run down to more
appropriate levels, and sterling moved to a premium on the S.A.£.
These were, of course, precisely the consequences which Strakosch, and
the banks, had predicted an appreciation of the S.A.£. would have.
However, a return to par would have involved a movement three to four
times as large, with its consequences correspondingly magnified. The
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other predicted effect was that the economy would be pushed into
recession. From May, when the trade balance moved into deficit and
bank deposits dropped as capital flowed out, the price level also
began to move downwards, leading to the onset of a recession which
lasted until 1922.
The banks actions, once their situation finally led them to unpeg
the S.A.£. from sterling, contributed to the state's acknowledgement
of the seriousness of the bank's plight, and to its new focus on this
as the key issue within the broader 'currency and exchange problem.'
The banks naturally fully endorsed the gold certificates scheme, which
they had been pushing since at least early December. In evidence
to the Select Committee, they analysed the likely effects of the em-
bargo being lifted along identical lines to Strakosch.
The banks had also argued vigorously that responsibility for the
currency should rest on the state, not on private capital. This of
course had only become an issue for them when it became costly, rather
than profitable, for the banks to perform this function. As a member
of the S.C. challenged Reynolds:
q. 1139. You say that it is the duty of the country to
provide its own currency, and that the responsibility of
doing that should rest on the government. When did the
banks find that out? - [Reynolds] When this huge premium
on gold arose.
Having taken up this strong stand on inconvertibility and on the
state's responsibility, the banks placed themselves in a position
where they could not oppose the state's proposal to establish a
central bank. The latter was, as noted, integrally linked to both the
gold certificates - these being seen by Smuts as 'only ^ -.palliative*,
with the bank 'the solution to the present difficulties' - and the
state's assumption of responsibility for the currency, since it was to
be given the sole right of note issue. Although the banks1 immediate
reaction to this aspect of the new policy, announced at their February
meeting with Farrer, was one of hostility, they essentially had no
choice but to accept at least the basic principle. As Gibson lamented
to his London office, 'it would not be wise to oppose the wish of the
Government to establish a Reserve Bank'. One danger for the banks
if they did so was that, without their support, the package as a whole
might collapse, including inconvertibility. On the other hand, the
state, to gain support for the central bank, threatened that the only
alternative was a 'State Bank1. This would be potentially subject to
political manipulation^ which worried the commercial banks even more
than a Reserve Bank.
The banks' basic position on the Reserve Bank, as expressed in
their evidence to the S.C, accepted it in principle, but argued that
it was not really necessary in S.A., because reserves were already
highly centralised. Nevertheless, it might play a useful role in
crises:
[In] the difficult years ahead [it] may serve a useful
purpose by affording re-discount facilities for expansion
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and in times of pressure. The banks hitherto have had to
depend on their cash reserves and if discounts can be used
as a second line of defence the position will be strength-
ened (SC2-'2O; evidence of J.P. Gibson, q 1505 a).
The banks focus^ed their attention on several less fundamental
issues relating to the Reserve Bank. They tried, somewhat unsuccess-
fully, to influence the structure of the Bank, and the degree of
control they would have over it via selection of directors and voting
powers. Two major concerns were the potential competition the
Reserve Bank would provide, and the timing of the Bank's introduction.
As Gibson telegraphed his head office from the Advisory Committee
meeting, he was 'direct[ing] efforts towards limiting competing powers
Central Jteserve Bank and making it as far as possible a Bankers'
Bank'. In this respect, the banks were relatively successful -
the Reserve Bank was barred from paying interest on deposit and
current accounts. The banks pressed for a provision making the Reserve
Bank discount their own bills at a rate 1% lower than those of the
public (q 3912 ff). This would institutionalise the 'Bankers' Bank1
approach, which the banks were anxious to do, being unsure of the
management style to be adopted (q 1860).
The other limitations on the Bank's competitiveness was the
requirement to back 40% of its liabilities with gold. This meant, as
Gibson pointed out (q 1859-1860), that 'if it is going to compete ...
it will continually be working down to its limits of reserve and for
urgent requirements it would have to go below the reserve requirement
... [Thus it] should try to keep its reserves well above the limit1.
The 40% reserve requirement was nevertheless a source of much
resentment from the banks. It meant that they would have to import
large amounts of specie to raise their low reserve ratios to the
required level. On these grounds, they argued strongly for a delay in
the Bank's establishment:
... the accumulation of balances in London is due to
circumstances created by the war ... we should not be
compelled to remove [these balances] whilst the heavy
premium on gold exists ... it would be monstrous to compel
us to incur such enormous expenditure ... merely because
there is haste to bring about a vital change in the
banking system ... the matter can very well wait until the
exchange position or the premium on gold has adjusted
itself ... (SC2-'2O; evidence of E.C. Reynolds, q 854).
Gibson warned (q 1509) that establishing the Bank 'at the present
difficult time is more likely to cause dislocation1 than improvement,
presumably because the sterling discount would increase and push the
economy into recession more quickly.
The banks were not, of course, successful in delaying the Reserve
Bank, and were forced to import large amounts of specie through 1920,
increasing their holdings by nearly 50%. The banks' attempts to
shape the Reserve Bank had not achieved very much. Nevertheless, they
were far from as hostile to it as generally depicted, and the
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overall thrust of monetary restructuring had changed dramatically from
the position at the time the new gold-marketing agreement was signed,
when the Chamber of Mines' needs held sway.
The third key factor in altering the position was the Chamber's
switch to supporting inconvertibility. At its quarterly meeting in
December 1919, Wallers, then the President, argued that 'the country
is endeavouring to maintain a gold currency basis which ... is surely
a hopeless attempt in view of world conditions and the insatiable
demand for gold ... the remedy ... is to be found in the issue of
Treasury Gold Certificates, fully backed by gold but temporarily
inconvertible. An issue of that description could not, we think,- have
any undesirable effect on the cost of living.' There is no
conclusive evidence indicating what led Wallers to this position-
However, he had met, shortly before, with Gibson, who was propounding
such a scheme. More significantly, perhaps, Strakosch , when he
arrived in S.A., joined the Chamber's sub-committees on exchange rates
and on banking and currency reform.
The certificates scheme itself would have no direct effect on the
mines or their receipt of the premium. However, the Chamber's support
for the scheme, and the situation of the banks, was reinforced by the
banks' increase in the sterling exchange rate. This began to cut
deeply into mining profits: 'in the month of April seventeen mines
made a loss whereas five of them would have made profits but for the
increase in exchange ... Any measure tending to reduce the banks'
charge will naturally be welcomed1 (SC2-'2O; evidence of H.O. Buckle,
President of Chamber of Mines, q 3212).
As far as a central bank was concerned, Wallers, at the annual
meeting for 1919 (held in April 1920), had enthusiastically supported
it, seeing it as having the ^potential to 'exert a stabilising and
healthy effect upon credit1. This was important to the Chamber in
view of its concern over inflation and wages. In his evidence to the
Select Committee, however, Buckle abstained on the issue: the Chamber
has no very pronounced views for or against the proposal (SC2-'2O, q.
3212). There is no evidence to provide an explanation for this.
VII
With the support* more or less, of the three major groupings with-
in imperial capital, the government was able to bypass opposition
to its policy. This came from Samuel Evans, a maverick mining capital-
ist (on this issue at least), who took a 'currency school' approach to
the question, and so was heavily critical of the banks. He felt that
the gold certificates would mask continuing overissue of other
banknotes, and so further propagate inflation. Opposition came
also from some Nationalist Party supporters, who blamed the sterling
(ie English) connection for the monetary problems of the country.
The bill passed through Parliament easily enough, even gaining the
support of most Nationalists. On December 15th, the Treasury
suspended the redemption of the gold certificates, making the bank
notes inconvertible. The gold certificates could be declared
irredeemible if the gold market price was above the standard price
(77s. 10 %d.), and the banks were compelled to accept them from the
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Treasury in exchange for all their gold coin.
The Reserve Bank, as originally constituted, was the means of
long-term restructuring of the monetary sphere. Together with the
gold certificates, it removed the responsibility for maintaining
internal stability in this sphere from the commercial banks. Its basic
functions, in its original form, were: to act as sole note-issuer
(secured by a gold reserve of 40%); to hold reserves of the commercial
banks (set at 13% of demand liabilities; to discount high class short-
term paper; and to make advances against short term paper, gold or
government securities. A maximum of 25% of its total reserves could
be held outside the country.
Thus, the central bank was to have the responsiblity of assuring
the convertibility of private bank money into the national currency.
In * normal1 periods, this was to be done by the clearing house
function, through adjusting the banks' reserves at the central bank,
and by the issue of notes. In situations of tight credit, the Bank
would act as 'lender of last resort', discounting the banks' bills, or
making advances to them through their deposits with it. However, to
gain greater control over the credit systems, the Bank had to be able
to impose its interest rate on the money market. At the level of
development of South African capitalism at the time, a money market
hardly existed and much of the first few years of the Bank's existence
was spent trying to create a bill market.
The Reserve Bank, at this stage, was directed towards the internal
aspect of the monetary system: 'it adopted a passive attitude in
respect of gold, and exchange transactions during its first few years
of operation.' This was a consequence of the structure given it by
the Act. As Gibson pointed out to the S.C.: 'The Reserve Bank, if
established, will have little if any effect on the exchange position
in South Africa1 (q 1505a).
The legislation did not include any provision for the mines' gold
output to be sold to the Reserve bank, and it was only when the gold
premium became smaller than the cost of shipping: ^ ie gold to London
that it was offered for sale to the Reserve Bank. It was only once
it had this control over the country's main source of foreign ex-
change, but more significantly, over the national output of 'interna-
tional money1, that the Bank was able to influence the exchange rates.
Given S.A.'s position as a gold producer, the exclusion of control
over the gold output from its constitution indicated its role at this
point in the relationship between national and imperial capital.
Its function and performance in its role as lender of last resort,
guaranteeing the 'reproduction of the general equivalent1 internally,
can be illustrated by a brief discussion of the National Bank crisis
in 1923. After the banks had begun their credit restrictions in
mid-1920 they 'showed undue haste and anxiety', so that the reces-
sion was deep and involved a very large number of bankruptcies (2 092
in 1921, and 2 424 in 1922, as compared with 468 in 1919 and an
average of 910 from 1910-13).
The low quality of the post-war advances had now come to light,
and the National Bank, as a result, faced a crisis of liquidity. It
thus was forced to use some of its reserve fund in 1922, and in 1923
to use up the rest of this fund and also write down its capital by
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15430%. , -c It was also forced to rediscount its bills at the Reserve
Bank. The Reserve Bank was able to carry out its functions as
lender of last resort successfully, and ensure that there would be no
general suspension of payments. (The National Bank was the second
largest of only three banks in S.A. at the time, so that its failure
would have been disastrous).
But this successful exercising of its function required, at this
early stage, assistance from both the South African Government and
the Bank of England, to maintain confidence in contracts and avoid
a general suspension. The announcement that the Bank of England was
prepared to discount the National Bank's bills was particularly
important, in preventing monetary chaos. This incident clearly
indicates that while the Bank of England retained a significant degree
of influences, the S.A. state was now responsible for local monetary
regulation.
VIII
The monetary restructuring, of which the Reserve Bank's
establishment was an element, was a consequence of problems engendered
by the changes in the balance of forces within the South African class
structure during World War I - both the decline of English financial
capital and the growth of national capital. The particular nature of
these changes meant also that while a central bank in S.A. was not a
necessary outcome of the monetary difficulties, what was required was
some form of local credit control. In this sense, the Reserve Bank's
establishment was partially 'indicative of the strength of "national"
forces', as Legassick put it.
The form the restructuring took was due in large measure, however,
to the intervention of unreconstructed 'imperial' capital. It was an
attempt to adapt, and to defend English financial capital's position.
Despite the breaking of new ground which it involved, it necessarily
meant a diminution of this group's earlier influence and control. It
was therefore contradictory, in that it would provide access for other
('national') social forces to exert some influence over monetary
policy, and so contribute to English financial capital's interests
being further eroded in the future. This contradiction, it would
seem, is indicative of the complexity and the duration of the
transition in South Africa during the interwar period from imperialist
domination to peripheral national capitalism.
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TABU ]
IMPORTS AW EXPORTS
Year
1910
1915
2914
1915
1916
1917
1916
1919
1920
1921
1922
192S
Value of
Imports ( I )
ooo •*
36,727
41,829
35,355
31,811
40,400
36,476
49,487
50.791
101.827
57.800
51,413
57.615
Voluae
of 1sports*
1.033
1,111
791
690
570
695
712
965
Value of
Exports (£
000'*
53,609
66,569
39,934
34.818
65,6'*
91,575
70,633
106,403
98,896
74,354
64,978
76,326
Voluse of
i Exports *
986
1.117
733
771
1,075
719
913
1,022
•Index BO. 1909-13 average
- 1000 (exports—of a l l SA produce,
excluding go ld)
Source:- H. H. De Kocl (1924), Selected Subjects i n the Economic History
of South Africa (Cape Town and Johannesburg)," jT."T26~
TABLE t
NAKUFACTURINC OUTPUT
Year
1915/16
1916/17
1917/18
1916/19
1919/20
1920/21
1921/22
1922/23
1923/24
Value of
Cross output
i'UUO* J
40,435
49,457
60,123
70.93S
92,914
98,308
79,446
74,466
79,789
Value
Added
(•ooo*)
18.119
21.433
25,874
79,914
39.063
40.343
36,623
37,346
40,586 .
(For 1911, the fTOis output figure vas &7.249.000).
Source: Union of South Africa, Office of Census and Stat ist ics ,
Official Year Boot of the Union. Wo. 6. 1923.
TABLE
BANK LIABILITIES AND CASH ASSETS
(£'000 )
Date
of)
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
June
Dec.
June
Dec.
Mar.
June
Dec.
Mar.
June
Sept.
Dec.
Mar.
June
Sept.
Dec.
(end
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1916
1919
1919
1920
1920
1920
1921
1921
1921
1921
1922
1922
1922
1922
Notes
(1)
2,263
2,374
2,680
3,381
4,527
5,426
6,269
6,572
7,984
9,011
8,799
9,066
8,870
8,535
8,698
8,764
8,929
7,597
2,012
1,236
Source: Union of
Kemmerer
Payments
Deposits
(V)
34,287
35,741
40,991
43,913
52,070
58,937
63,502
75,279
88,073
94,365
86,082
78,145
75,700
71,657
70,358
71,287
70,167
67,299
65,902
66,298
South Africa
and Dr. G. '
Gold Coin
bullion &
certificates
r»
7,064
6,307
6,587
5,558
6,172
6,600
6,851
7,532
7,303
7,644
9,704
10", 365
11,083
6,495
6,351
7,122
6,935
4,775
1,992
1,761
Cash:
Liabilities
19.3
16.5
15.0
11.7
10.9
10.2
9.8
9.2
7.6
7.3
10.2
11.8
13.1
15.2
17.5
17.0
17.9
18.8
15.2
14.5
(1925), Report submitted by Dr.
Vissering on the
by the Union ot South Africa
. -. »* .
Advances OAC( •
Di scounts
32,954
29,697
30,152
36,826
.35,842
38,565
48.502
49.871
53,538
56,356
63,920
69,911
65,630
61,698
56,675
54,999
55,429
50,640
48,911
46,200
E. W.
Resumption of Gold
L (U&I3, Prc+orf
Annexure 1 1 .
Ccl •=. Col. 3 •/. fcJ.OJ + u l .
